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COMES NOW the PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS hereinafter "Plaintiffs" 
and submit the following REPLY BRIEF in the above captioned case: 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY RULED THAT DEFENDANT 
HAD BREACHED THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
AND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY 
FEES THEREBY. 
A. Pursuant to the uniform real estate 
contract between the parties, the 
Plaintiffs had an absolute right to declare 
acceleration of the contract. 
Defendant, Westport Funding Co. continues to maintain 
that Plaintiffs breached the uniform real estate contract by 
declaring acceleration of said contract, citing Home Owner Loan 
Corp. v. Washington. 161 P.2d 355, 358 (Utah 1945). However, 
notwithstanding the purported applicability of that case, the 
express language of the contract expressly prescribed the actions 
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ultimately taken by the Plaintiffs. Specifically, the contract 
explicitly provides that: 
16. In the event of failure to comply with 
the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure 
of the Buyer to make any payment or payments 
when the same shall become due, or within 
thirty (3) days thereafter, the Seller, at his 
option shall have the following alternative 
remedies: 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his 
option, and upon written notice to the 
Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid balance 
hereunder at once due and payable, and may 
elect to treat this contract as a note and 
mortgage, and pass title to the Buyer 
subject thereto, and proceed immediately to 
foreclose the same in accordance with the 
laws of the State of Utah, and have the 
property sold and the proceeds applied to 
the payment of the balance owing including 
costs and attorney fees; and the Seller may 
have a judgment for any deficiency which 
may remain. In the case of foreclosure, 
the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a 
complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take 
possession of said mortgaged property and 
collect the rents, issue any profits 
therefrom and apply the same to the payment 
of the obligation hereunder, or hold the 
same pursuant to the order of the court; 
and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of 
foreclosure, shall be entitled to the 
possession of the said premises during the 
period of redemption. 
In the instant case, it is uncontroverted that the 
Plaintiffs did not receive the January 1991 payment until after 
February 15, thus constituting a default under the contract. In 
fact, the court even noted: 
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Now, I have indicated even though in the 
best light to the defendant, if tender were as 
I have indicated is my holding, if the payments 
were tendered, they were still late. But does 
that constitute a breach under these 
circumstances where acceleration could then be 
justified pursuant to the uniform real estate 
contract as evidenced by P-l? Mr Wilson, as he 
correctly stated many times, that forfeiture 
then becomes a question of equity. And it is 
my opinion that equity would forbid me from 
allowing the acceleration of this contract 
based upon questionable $95 missed payments. 
Even though they were, as I indicated tendered, 
but late, they were late only on the February 
payment— excuse me, on the January payment. 
They were late only by one or two days. 
Transcript of Ruling 10-11. 
Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs complied with the express 
terms of the agreement between the parties with respect to 
acceleration, they could not possibly have breached the agreement. 
Accordingly, the District Court erred in concluding that their 
declaration of acceleration and attempted foreclosure was a breach 
of the contract. 
II. THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL TO 
SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT 
THE JANUARY 1, 1991 CHECK WAS FOR THE 
PAYMENT THAT WAS DUE DECEMBER 15, 1990. 
Defendant, Westport Funding, cross appeals, claiming the 
trial court erred in finding that the January 1, 1991 check was 
for the payment that was due on December 15, 1990. In so arguing, 
Defendant smugly claims that it has marshalled all the evidence in 
support of the finding and that such evidence is insufficient to 
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support the finding, citing Cove View Excavating & Const, s. 
Flynn, 758 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1988). However, certain 
evidence is conspicuously absent in the Defendant's marshalling 
effort. Particularly, the Defendant fails to note certain 
testimony evidence of Mr. Strasrypka which would, in and of 
itself, be sufficient to support the trial court's finding. 
Specifically, Mr. Strasrypka testified that he had personal 
knowledge that the payments from Clella Glazier were consistently 
late. His testimony was as follows: 
Q. [By Ms. Van Frank]: It is my understanding 
that it is your position that Mrs. Glazier has been 
late from the very first payment she ever made to 
your father, is that correct? 
A. That's correct 
Q. Your father had the dealing with Mrs. 
Glazier when she took over the property; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes, I believe so. 
Q. You didn't have dealings with mrs. Glazier, 
is that correct? 
A. No. 
Q. And your knowledge of your father's 
dealings with Mrs. Glazier came directly from your 
father; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. You weren't there when the property was is 
that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
4 
Q. And so your alleyway source of getting 
information about whether or not she was late or 
early or otherwise in her payments was your father, 
right? 
A. Yes 
Q. The basis of your personal knowledge as to 
whether or not [Mrs. Glazier] was early or late, is 
your records, that's what you testified to earlier; 
isn't that correct? 
Q. On page 2 on page 32 [of Mr. Strasrypka's 
deposition] excuse me. At line 2 on page 32 I have 
asked you the question, "Have you found any bank 
records of your own to reconstruct payment dates 
from Mrs. Glazier?" and your response was, no, you 
hadn't found any payments or any records of your 
own. And then I asked you if you found any bank 
records of your father's, and your answer was, no, 
these checks were cashed immediately. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You have no records— you have no records. 
You have only the checks that you recall receiving 
on the first of the month for more than ten years; 
isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Following, such testimony, Ms. Van Frank moved the court 
to strike Mr. Strasrypka's evidence based on the same objection 
she raises before this court on appeal. However, the court denied 
such motion, ruling: 
5 
[By the court]: Generally—well, the motion to 
strike is denied. As the fact finding, I'm able to 
distinguish as to what those events which he has 
personal knowledge of, those that he is basing it on 
objective testimony. the motion to strike is 
overruled. I will be able to decide how to 
reconcile any apparent conflict. 
R. 42. 
Based on the foregoing, it is abundantly clear that the 
Plaintiff, Mr. Strasrypka, had personal knowledge, independent of 
any records or other documentation, that Ms. Glazier was 
consistently late in making her payments. The court explicitly 
recognized the apparent inconsistency between the Plaintiff's 
trial testimony and his deposition testimony and afforded Mr. 
Strasrypka's testimony that he had independent knowledge that the 
payments were invariably late the appropriate deference. Because, 
the Plaintiff's testimony was sufficient to support the court's 
ultimate finding that the January 1, 1991 check was for the 
payment that was due on December 15, 1990, such finding is not 
clearly erroneous. 
Additionally, the district court had before it the checks 
written by Mrs. Glazier (Exhibit 29) and the amortization schedule 
(Exhibit 2) upon which the court could reconstruct the payment 
schedule and thereby reconcile any dispute as to when Mrs. Glazier 
made her payments under the contract. Such evidence would 
likewise be sufficient to support the court's finding that the 
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January 1, 191 check was for the payment that was due on December 
15, 1990. Accordingly, inasmuch as the Defendant failed to 
marshall all of the evidence in support of the court's finding, 
this court need not consider the Defendant's challenge to such 
finding. Moreover, if this court elects to consider such 
challenge, there was certainly sufficient evidence before the 
district court to support the finding. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the 
district court's ruling that the Plaintiffs defaulted under the 
uniform real estate contract so as to entitle the Defendant to the 
award of attorney fees. 
DATED this \ day of J^j^p^/^J^ , 1994. 
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